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CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDY IN DYING:
RESPONSES TO SOME COMMON
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE
James E. Fleming*
[W]e are ourselves authors of a tragedy, and that the finest and
best we know how to make. [Olur whole polity has been con-
structed as a dramatization of a noble and perfect life; that is
what we hold to be in truth the most real of tragedies.'
I. Introduction
I shall argue for the constitutional right to die, including the right
of terminally ill persons to physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, I
shall argue that it would be a constitutional tragedy if the Supreme
Court were to hold that the Constitution does not protect such a
right to die,2 and thus to overrule the Ninth Circuit decision in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington3 (to say nothing of the Second
Circuit decision in Quill v. Vacco4). First, such a holding would
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D. 1985, Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri. I am grate-
ful to Sot Barber, Sherry Colb, Mike Dorf, Martin Flaherty, Ned Foley, Abner
Greene, Sandy Levinson, Linda McClain, Russell Pearce, Bill Treanor, and Ben
Zipursky for helpful comments on an earlier essay from which I draw in this essay. I
also would like to thank my research assistants Mark Hagelin and Melissa Lawton.
1. PLATO, THE LAWS, BOOK VII, at 817b (A.E. Taylor trans.), in THE COL-
LECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
2. This essay speaks as of May 1, 1997, before the Supreme Court handed down
its predictable and regrettable decisions rejecting the right of terminally ill persons to
physician-assisted suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997);
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293 (1997). I have not revised the essay in light of those
decisions. I plan to criticize those decisions in subsequent work.
3. See 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). I shall put to one side all of the difficult issues
concerning whether there are crucial distinctions between the right to die conceived
as the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the right to die conceived as
the right to physician-assisted suicide. I believe that Judge Reinhardt convincingly
showed that many proffered distinctions of this sort, although familiar, are distinctions
without a difference. Id. at 820-24. I also believe that Reinhardt persuasively argued
that state interests, such as avoiding the involvement of third parties, and precluding
the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence, do not justify a total ban on physician-
assisted suicide, although they do justify the creation of procedural safeguards. Id. at
825-27, 832-33.
4. See 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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entail that the Constitution sanctions a grievous wrong, a horrible
form of tyranny: allowing the state to impose upon some citizens,
against the grain of their conscientious, considered convictions
about dying with dignity, what they regard as a ruinous, tragic end-
ing of their lives.' Second, such a decision would represent an aw-
ful interpretive tragedy: for the Constitution, rightly interpreted,
does not permit this dreadful evil but to the contrary allows citizens
to author their own tragic endings. Here, I shall draw upon an es-
say I wrote for a recent Symposium on "Constitutional Tragedies."6
Then, I shall respond to some of the most common arguments
against such a right, including several policy. arguments that have
been made in this Symposium. My general tack will be to argue
that, whatever the merits of those arguments, none provides a good
constitutional argument against recognizing a constitutional right
to die, including physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, all of
those arguments, to the extent that they have merit, can be ad-
dressed through procedural safeguards surrounding the exercise of
that constitutional right or through governmental provision of ba-
sic services. I fear that much of the discussion about the right to
die proceeds at the level of policy arguments that lose sight of the
fact that a fundamental constitutional right is at stake here. As the
final panelist in "A Symposium on Health Care, Poverty and Au-
tonomy,"7 I believe that it is incumbent upon me, especially after
what we have heard on this panel, to shore up autonomy as a con-
stitutional right.
H. Constitutional Tragedy in Dying
It would be tragic if the Supreme Court were to hold that the
Constitution does not protect the right to die, including the right of
terminally ill persons to physician-assisted suicide. First, the state's
proscription of physician-assisted suicide is tantamount to conscrip-
tion of terminally ill persons into involuntary servitude.' For the
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 217 (1993). See also Ronald Dwor-
kin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997,
at 41.
6. See James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or Whose Tragedy Is
It, Anyway? in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, eds., forthcoming 1998). I prepared that
essay for a program on "Constitutional Tragedies," held at the Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, January 7, 1997.
7. 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663 (1997).
8. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing
that "[b]y restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women's
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state commandeers those persons' bodies, lives, and deaths into
service in fostering its conception of how to honor the sanctity of
life. It exposes its dangerous presupposition that ultimately per-
sons do not own themselves but are "mere creatures of the state"
or of God.9 What is more, the state exacts such service in the face
of those persons' conscientious, considered convictions about how
to lead their own lives and deaths, and indeed about how to respect
the sanctity of life.1" Thus, the state attempts to use terminally ill
persons' bodies, lives, and deaths as pulpits for preaching a
message or viewpoint about sanctity which they themselves consci-
entiously reject.
In effect, the state tries to impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment, or imprisonment in life, upon terminally ill persons who wish
to end their own lives. To be sure, the state seeks to justify this
evil, requiring this undignified sacrifice and unspeakable suffering,
in the name of a supreme good or ultimate value, promoting re-
spect for the sanctity of life. That effort does not redeem the evil
but to the contrary makes it more terrible and tyrannical. For it
shows that the state's asserted power to promote respect for the
sanctity of life by prohibiting physician-assisted suicide is "an in-
bodies into its service . ). . I realize that some will object that the state does not
compel terminally ill persons to do anything, much less conscript them into involun-
tary servitude. In particular, they may contend that the state does not forbid such
persons from committing suicide; it simply prohibits them from getting physicians'
assistance in doing so. But that claim does not defeat the analogy to involuntary
servitude, any more than a similar claim would defeat the analogy between involun-
tary servitude and the forced continuation of a pregnancy. It would be absurd to say
that the Constitution protects the right of women to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy, but does not protect the right to physician-assisted abortion (as if the right
to abortion embraced only self-performed abortion). It would be equally problematic
to say that the Constitution protects the right of terminally ill persons to decide
whether to terminate their lives, but does not protect the right to physician-assisted
suicide (as if the right to die encompassed only self-performed suicide). As for the
tirelessly repeated claims that there is a fundamental difference between "passive"
and "active" euthanasia, I have nothing to add to Judge Reinhardt's powerful rejec-
tion of those claims. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 820-24.
9. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating that "[t]he
child is not the mere creature of the State .... "). But see Stephen L. Carter, Rush to a
Lethal Judgment, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 1996, at 28 (approvingly stating that the
laws in England and America that prohibited suicide "reflected a strong belief that
the lives of individuals belonged not to themselves alone but to the communities in
which they lived and to the God who gave them breath."). See also Michael J. Sandel,
Last Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1997, at 27.
10. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 217.
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jury got up as a gift," an intolerable evil disguised and imposed as a
supreme good.1
Second, the state's prohibition of physician-assisted suicide
usurps citizens' power to make certain important decisions for
themselves. Elsewhere, I have argued that the right to die is
among the basic liberties that are essential to deliberative auton-
omy (as distinguished from deliberative democracy): Such rights
reserve to persons the power to deliberate about and decide how to
live their own lives, with respect to certain matters unusually im-
portant for such self-government, over a complete life, from cradle
to grave.12 Put another way, these basic liberties are significant
preconditions for persons' development and exercise of delibera-
tive autonomy in making certain fundamental decisions affecting
their destiny, identity, or way of life, and they span a complete life-
time. Decisions concerning the timing and manner of a person's
death are among the most significant decisions for deliberative au-
tonomy that a person may make in a lifetime. If the Constitution
does not reserve such decisions to persons, it betrays its "promise"
of a "rational continuum" of liberty. 13 A Constitution that does
not protect the right to die, paradoxically, is not worth living under
and not worth dying for.
These claims about conscription and usurpation suggest that the
Constitution, if interpreted not to protect the right to die, would be
woefully imperfect from the standpoint of a vigorous conception of
deliberative autonomy. But would this amount to a constitutional
tragedy? It would be tragic because it would entail that the Consti-
tution sanctions a terrible evil, a horrible form of tyranny: allowing
the state to impose upon some citizens, against the grain of their
conscientious, considered convictions about dying with dignity,
what they regard as a ruinous, tragic ending of their lives. The
Constitution would permit the state to do this at the crucial mo-
ment when terminally ill persons were seeking to author the final
chapters of their own personal tragedies.
11. Cf Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 100 (1987) (arguing that the right of privacy may readily
prove, for women, to be "an injury got up as a gift"). Similarly, Judge Reinhardt
criticized the district court decision invalidating Oregon's Death With Dignity Act
because it "treats a burden [prohibition of physician-assisted suicide] as a benefit and
a benefit [the right to physician-assisted suicide] as a burden." Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 838 (criticizing Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or.
1995)).
12. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1995).
13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50, 901 (1992) (joint opinion).
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The noble protagonists in this constitutional tragedy are citizens
who have the courage to use their own deliberative reason and to
take responsibility for their own lives and for their own judgments
about how to respect the sanctity of life. The tragic flaw of these
protagonists-the characteristic that is both their greatness and
their downfall-is their autonomy, their daring to live autono-
mously rather than as mere creatures of the state or of God. They
seek to exercise their deliberative autonomy, to give their tragedies
a good, dignified, and noble ending, to write their own final chap-
ters in character with, or so as to maintain integrity with, their con-
ceptions of a good life-to die, as to live, with dignity.14 The state,
however, wishes to usurp their authorship of their own tragedies,
to conscript them as mere players in its own tragedy about the
sanctity of life. Thus, the state refuses to "[v]ex not [their]
ghost[s]" as they lie terminally ill, at death's door.' 5 Instead, it pro-
longs their pain and exacerbates their anguish, in effect maintain-
ing wards of would-be cadavers as monuments to its view of the
sanctity of life.
Most problematically, the state asserts, at terminally ill persons'
ultimate moment of self-authorship, that they are not in fact the
authors of their own lives and tragedies. The state proclaims that it
is the author of their lives, at least of their tragedies. It basically
says to them what the Athenian Stranger (on behalf of the state)
says to the tragedians in Plato's Laws: "[W]e are ourselves authors
of a tragedy, and that the finest and best we know how to make.
[O]ur whole polity has been constructed as a dramatization of a
noble and perfect life; that is what we hold to be in truth the most
real of tragedies."' 6 But in our constitutional democracy, citizens
are not mere creatures of the state or of God, nor are we mere
players in the state's tragedy, its "dramatization of a noble and per-
fect life." Rather, we citizens are the authors of our own tragedies,
"the finest and best we know how to make." The state is not au-
thorized to act as the master tragedian. 7 We must ask: "Whose
14. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 199-213.
15. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act V, sc. 3, (cited in
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 821).
16. See PLATO, supra note 1, at 817b.
17. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) ("[The] ideas touching the
relation between individual and state [in Plato's ideal commonwealth, which 'sub-
merge the individual and develop ideal citizens'] were wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest . . ").
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tragedy is it, anyway?"' 8 In our constitutional democracy, the an-
swer is: "It is each citizen's, not the state's."
HI. Responses to Some Common Arguments Against the
Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide
Next, I want to outline responses to some common arguments
against the constitutional right to die, including the right of termi-
nally ill persons to physician-assisted suicide. First, we sometimes
hear the argument that many people who would exercise the right
to physician-assisted suicide are mentally ill, clinically depressed,
or in great pain.19 But this is not an argument against protecting
the right to die. One might just as well argue, from the fact that
many people who vote are poorly informed about the candidates
and issues, against recognizing the right to vote. That is, this is
instead an argument for providing care to the mentally ill or clini-
cally depressed who wish to. commit physician-assisted suicide and
treatment to those in pain. Similarly, the observation regarding
voting justifies an argument for providing better education and en-
couraging people to be responsible citizens who are well informed
about candidates and issues. Again, this concern about mentally ill
or clinically depressed persons is better as an argument for health
care for those persons than as an argument against recognizing the
right to die. Let us provide them with that care and then let them
make their own decisions.
Second, we sometimes, hear the argument that there are risks for
vulnerable communities, such as urban poor and racial minorities.
We have heard these arguments before, against a right to abortion.
In arguing against protection of the constitutional right to abortion,
some argued that poor women, including racial minorities, would
be vulnerable to pressure to have abortions instead of carrying
their fetuses to term.2" In fact, to the contrary, we got the Hyde
Amendments, which forbid Medicaid funding of abortions for poor
women while paying for childbirth.21 Thus, if anything, the govern-
ment provides incentives (if not pressure) for poor women not to
have abortions. Predictably, we have already seen the same move
18. I allude, of course, to BRIAN CLARK, WHOSE LIFE IS IT, ANYWAY? (1980).
19. See, e.g., Ellen H. Moskowitz, Mental Illness, Physical Illness, and the Legaliza-
tion of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 24 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 781 (1997).
20. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 830 (noting that opponents of the right to
abortion contended that legalizing abortion would lead to its widespread use as a
means of racial genocide).
21. The constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment in the context of abortion fund-
ing was upheld in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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with respect to the right to physician-assisted suicide. On April 30,
1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Fund-
ing Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal
funds in support of physician-assisted suicide.22 Thus, the federal
government forbids funding of physician-assisted suicide for poor
people while paying for medical expenses related to keeping them
alive.
Beyond the analogy between physician-assisted suicide and
abortion, I want to make the more general point that it is common
to overstate the extent to which people would succumb to pressure
to request physician-assisted suicide. I believe that this argument
terribly underestimates persons' strong drive for self-preservation.
I doubt that persons' will can be so easily overborne with respect to
such life and death decisions. Having said that, I would argue that
if indeed there are legitimate worries about risks for vulnerable
communities, they can be met by procedural safeguards against un-
due influence or duress or the like. That is, these worries justify
such procedural safeguards, but they do not justify. denying the
constitutional right to die. I believe that Professor Alan Meisel's
analysis was quite cogent in that respect.3
Third, a further analogy between abortion and physician-assisted
suicide is appropriate. I acknowledge that some reasonable per-
sons, physicians, and clergy are morally opposed to physician-as-
sisted suicide, just as some are opposed to abortion. But that
should not be dispositive of the question whether the Constitution
protects such rights. In considering this question, we should re-
member the important words from the joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: "Some of us as individuals find abortion of-
fensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot
control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code. ' 24 I believe that many per-
sons, physicians, and clergy who argue against the right to die and
the right to abortion ignore or lose sight of this important point.
At the risk of seeming flippant or disrespectful, I will mention
that recently, I received a catalog advertising political tee-shirts
and buttons. I saw a tee-shirt that said: "Against abortion? Don't
have one." I would like to make the analogous statement to oppo-
nents of physician-assisted suicide: "Against physician-assisted sui-
22. Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-14408).
23. See Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for
State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817 (1997).
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
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cide? Don't have one." And to physicians: "Against physician-
assisted suicide? Don't provide such assistance." And to clergy:
"Against physician-assisted suicide? Preach it in your church or
synagogue." But seriously, recognizing a constitutional right to die
(or to abortion) leaves room for moral disagreement and debate
among citizens about that right.
Fourth, we sometimes hear the argument that protecting the
right to die will change the moral environment for the worse, for it
will undermine respect for the sanctity of life. This formulation
misconceives the argument about the right to die. The argument is
not between those who affirm the value of respect for the sanctity
of life (by opposing this right) and those who deny the value of
respect for the sanctity of life (by supporting this right). Rather,
the argument is about a different question: Who should decide how
best to respect the sanctity of life, the state or individuals (in the
exercise of their deliberative autonomy)? This brings us to the
question: Whose life is it, anyway? Or, again: Whose tragedy is it,
anyway?2
5
My argument is that our Constitution leaves to individuals the
right and the responsibility to decide how best to respect the sanc-
tity of life in deciding such questions of one's own life and death. I
repeat: It is a horrible form of tyranny for the state to usurp this
decisionmaking authority by treating persons as mere creatures of
the state or of God. Protecting that right-and that allocation of
responsibility-secures the moral environment within which our
basic liberties thrive. Furthermore, protecting the right of individ-
uals to make the decision regarding physician-assisted suicide does
not preclude the state from adopting measures that seek to en-
courage reflective, deliberative, and responsible decisionmaking
about such significant matters. But the state may not enact meas-
ures that compel persons to make the decision that it prefers.
Finally, we sometimes hear the argument that it would be cruelly
ironic if we got a right to kill ourselves before we got the right to be
kept alive, that is, the right to health care. Put another way, the
claim is that it would be ironic if we got the affirmative right to
physician-assisted suicide before we got the affirmative right to
health care generally. But this supposed irony dissolves under
close analysis. It exploits two different senses of affirmative: first,
affirmative in the sense of "active" euthanasia versus "passive" eu-
thanasia, and second, affirmative in the sense of a positive right
25. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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that the government affirmatively fund the exercise of one's consti-
tutional rights.
The right to physician-assisted suicide is not really an affirmative
right in either of these senses. As for the first sense, the fact that
the right to die includes the right to physician-assisted suicide is no
more "affirmative" or "active" than the fact that the right to abor-
tion includes the right to physician-assisted abortion. It would be
absurd to say that the Constitution protects the right of women to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, but does not protect the
right to physician-assisted abortion (as if the right to abortion em-
braced only self-performed abortion). It would be equally prob-
lematic to say that the Constitution protects the right of terminally
ill persons to decide whether to terminate their own lives, but does
not protect the right to physician-assisted suicide (as if the right to
die encompassed only self-performed suicide). As for the second
sense, neither the Ninth Circuit decision in Compassion in Dying
nor the Second Circuit decision in Quill recognized an affirmative
right to die in the sense of a positive right that the government
affirmatively fund the exercise of that right.
Even if I concede that there is an irony here, I would argue that
the irony points to the need to make the case for provision for
health care generally rather than suggesting a justification for de-
nying the right to die. It is indeed a terrible shortcoming of consti-
tutional law today that people think we have a negative
Constitution rather than a Constitution that imposes affirmative
obligations upon government to provide for basic needs of all per-
sons. It is also a deplorable shortcoming of American politics to-
day that the citizenry evidently lacks the political will to honor such
obligations. But it is cruel to make terminally ill persons who seek
physician-assisted suicide suffer because of these shortcomings of
constitutional law and American politics.
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